Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Natural Kinds, philosophy: deviating from the biological definition, substances such as gold, water, etc. are referred to as natural kinds in the recent philosophical discussion. This goes back to the way in which these terms were introduced. (See H. Putnam, “The Meaning of 'Meaning”'. In Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2. Mind, Language and Reality, Cambridge.) Starting from a primary showing, the natural kind is defined as "something like this". The decisive point here is that there is no limit to future research. Virtually, any property that is initially attributed can prove to be a false assumption. See also introduction, definitions, terms._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Stephen Schiffer on Natural Kinds - Dictionary of Arguments
I 37 Description theory/natural kind/twin earth/Schiffer: no solution: "the beings that are co-specific with such and such looking beings which I met". >Twin earth, >Description theory, >Identification, >Reference. Then "cat" refers to both. - That does not work (see below). Belief/Schiffer: belief must not be single digit, then it would not be indexed to the person. - (Twin earth: then both had the same belief anyway). >Beliefs. I 41 Natural kind/belief/Schiffer: Problem: the theories of Kripke/Putnam for natural kinds are unsuitable for belief predicates. Kripke: original term "dog": "this kind of thing" - (paradigmatic instances). >Natural kinds/Kripke, >Natural kinds/Putnam, >Twin earth/Putnam, >Belief properties. I 54 Natural kind/proposition/belief/Schiffer: E.g. Tanya believes that Gustav is a dog. Problem: the proposition cannot be the content of belief, because there is no representation of the role that represents the natural kind term "dog" here. >Proposition, >Belief content. 1. possibility: that-sentence with predicate, "that" refers to property (dog) - (Classic: they are introduced directly into the proposition). 2. Frege: the proposition does not contain the dog property, but a way of givenness, which is how Tanya imagines dog property (belief de re). >Way of givenness. Problem: then the that-sentence does not refer to the complete content of belief, but e.g. (∃m) (m is a manner of presentation of dog property & B (Tanya)). Then (3) cannot be the content of belief: (3) ‹Gustav, the property of being a dog› >That-clause. Natural kind: it may be that there is no non-pleonastic language-independent characteristic of being a dog. I 55 Natural kind/Wittgenstein/Putnam/Kripke: natural kinds are not to define by obsertion terms (or observable properties). Because we lack appropriate expressions for dog-like appearance and behavior. Correct: properties of acquaintance/Russell. >Acquaintance._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
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> Counter arguments against Schiffer
> Counter arguments in relation to Natural Kinds
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-28